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301 
Safety from Plea-Bargains’ Hazards 
 




There is a significant risk—in safety terms, a hazard—that 
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment if 
convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he 
confesses in a plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but also 
the innocent to confessing.  In practice, only 3% of all federal 
cases go to trial, and only 6% of state cases.  In the remainder, 
conviction is obtained through plea-bargaining.  Indeed, plea-
bargains are one of the central mechanisms facilitating false 
convictions. 
In other fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is 
well understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in 
modern safety methods, which reduce significantly the rate of 
accidents.  This is the case, for example, in the aviation field, 
which abandoned the “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach and developed 
more advanced safety methods that generally follow an 
“Identify-Analyze-Control” model and are aimed at “First-Time-
Safe.”  Under this approach, there is systematic identification of 
future hazards, analysis of the probability of their occurrence, 
and a complete neutralization of the risk, or at least its 
reduction to an acceptable level. 
A false conviction is a system error and accident just like a 
plane crash.  But in criminal law, a Hidden Accidents Principle 
governs and almost all the false convictions are never detected.  
Therefore, not enough thought has been given to the system’s 
safety.  Empiric studies based on the Innocence Project’s 
findings point to a very high false-conviction rate: at least 5% 
 
* Professor of Law, College of Law & Business, Ramat-Gan, Israel; and School 
of Law, Sapir College, Israel.  I thank Prof. Rinat Kitai-Sangero for her 
tremendous help in all the stages of the writing.  I also thank Dr. Daniel 
Hartmann, who introduced me to the STAMP safety model, and Prof. Nancy 
Leveson and Dana Meshulam-Rothmann for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft.  Finally, I also thank Prof. Oren Gazal-Ayal for his helpful 
comments on an advanced draft. 
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for the most serious crimes.  Regarding convictions based on 
plea-bargains, the rate is probably significantly higher since the 
commission of the offense and the guilt of the accused are not 
proved by significant evidence. 
This article proposes a theory and some initial tools for 
incorporating modern safety into the criminal justice system.  
Specifically, I demonstrate how the innovative “System-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) safety 
model can be applied in the criminal justice system, by 
developing constraints, controls, and barriers against the 
existing hazards in the context of convictions based on plea-
bargains. 
Additionally, the article suggests an innovative idea, of 
recognizing defendants’ right to a fair plea-bargain offer.  
Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the goodwill of a 
particular prosecutor toward a particular defendant or her 
defense counsel. 
 
I.   Introduction…………………………………………………302 
II.  Safety from False Convictions……………………………306 
III.  The Hazard of False Convictions Based on Plea- 
Bargains……………………………………………………..312 
IV.  Safety Measures..............................................................321 
V.  Applying the STAMP Model to Plea-Bargains…..…….328 




There is a significant risk—in safety terms, a hazard—that 
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment 
if convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he 
confesses in the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but 
also the innocent to confessing.  Plea bargains in the United 
States create huge incentives for innocent people to plead 
guilty.  It is generally acknowledged that innocent defendants 
are offered great enticements to falsely confess.  The system 
also imposes a heavy quasi-fine on those who insist on going to 
trial—a defendant who maintains his innocence is harshly 
punished, which impels the majority of defendants to confess 
regardless of actual guilt or innocence.  In practice, only three 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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percent of all federal cases go to trial, and only six percent of 
state cases.  In the remainder, conviction is obtained through 
plea-bargaining.  Indeed, plea-bargains are one of the central 
mechanisms facilitating false convictions. 
The mistaken assumption of a low false-conviction rate has 
been challenged in the last quarter of century.  This has been 
primarily a result of the Innocence Project, in which hundreds 
of cases of false convictions have been exposed through genetic 
testing, and empiric studies based on the Project’s findings, 
which point to a very high false-conviction rate—at least five 
percent for the most serious crimes (rape-murder) and an 
apparently even higher rate for less serious crimes.1  Regarding 
convictions based on plea-bargains, the rate is probably 
significantly higher since the commission of the offense and the 
guilt of the accused are not proved by significant evidence—it is 
sufficient for the case to be closed with a conviction that the 
defendant confessed.  When a defendant waives his right to a 
full trial and suffices with conviction in a plea-bargain, he is 
also waiving the requirement to prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt, which is one of the principal mechanisms for preventing 
false convictions. 
In other fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is 
well understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in 
modern safety methods, which reduce significantly the rate of 
accidents.  This is the case, for example, in the field of 
pharmaceuticals and drugs, where in the first half of the 
twentieth-century, the need for safety was already 
acknowledged and internalized, and the necessary powers and 
authorities were granted to the FDA to ensure this.  This was 
also the case in the space field and in the aviation field, which 
abandoned the “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach in the mid-twentieth 
century and developed more advanced safety methods that 
generally follow an “Identify-Analyze-Control” model and are 
aimed at “First-Time-Safe.”  Under this approach, there is 
systematic identification of future hazards, analysis of the 
probability of their occurrence, and a complete neutralization of 
the risk, or at least its reduction to an acceptable level.  
 
1.  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified 
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779 
(2007). 
3
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Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented in 
other fields as well, such as engineering and transportation, 
and later, in medicine and labor.  These safety systems are 
constructed on safety education and training, a culture of 
safety, a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents 
(near-accidents), professional risk assessment, a process of 
perpetual improvement, and the understanding that safety in 
each component of a system is not sufficient for achieving 
system safety, which demand overall thinking about the entire 
system. 
In the criminal justice system, too, accidents happen—false 
convictions.  Therefore, this system must also be classified as a 
“safety-critical system.”2  Because such systems entail matters 
of life and death, any system error is likely to cause severe 
harm to both individuals and society.  A false conviction is a 
system error and accident just like a plane crash, not only from 
a metaphorical perspective but also in the very realistic terms 
of economic cost.3  However, in criminal law, a Hidden 
Accidents Principle governs4—the overwhelming majority of 
false convictions are never detected, which led to the erroneous 
assumption that they occur at an almost negligible rate and 
that the criminal justice system is almost perfect.  Therefore, 
almost no thought has been given to safety in the system, and 
the criminal justice system lags far behind other areas. 
The article proposes a theory and some initial tools for 
incorporating modern safety into the criminal justice system.  
 
2. In a coauthored article with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, we have 
suggested applying the term “safety-critical system” to the criminal justice 
system.  See Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to the 
Conviction of an Innocent Person: Why Forensic Science Evidence Should Be 
Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a Safety-Critical System, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 70 (2009) [hereinafter From a Plane Crash]. 
3.  See Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the 
Criminal Justice System, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1293, 1304–05 [hereinafter 
Safety Doctrine].  Incorporating into the criminal justice system a modern 
safety theory that is commonly accepted in other areas, such as aviation, 
engineering, and transportation, is an idea that was developed jointly by 
myself and Dr. Mordechai Halpert and presented in the above two 
coauthored articles. See id.; From a Plane Crash, supra note 2.  My current 
article is intended to expand the preliminary proposition and engage in the 
application of the modern safety theory in the criminal justice system, 
specifically regarding plea-bargains. 
.4  Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1314-16. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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Specifically, it demonstrates how the innovative “System-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) safety 
model can and should be applied in the criminal justice 
system, by developing constraints, controls, and barriers 
against the existing hazards in the context of plea-bargains 
that end with false convictions.  The suggested safety theory 
and tools presented here are, moreover, universal, rather than 
being applicable only to certain criminal law systems.  I believe 
that every criminal law system can benefit from adopting it. 
Each year the U.S. criminal justice system produces 
millions of convictions of the guilty but, unfortunately, also 
tens of thousands of convictions of the innocent.  In the present 
situation, there is a systematic infliction and perpetuation of 
the greatest injustice that the state routinely causes to its 
citizens—the criminal conviction of the innocent.  Fundamental 
reforms and changes are needed.  Hopefully, this article will 
contribute to taking significant steps toward safety and to 
inspiring others to take up the challenge to further develop 
safety in the criminal justice system. 
Until the plea-bargain industry is abolished, or at least 
becomes less common and safer, the article innovatively 
proposes recognizing defendants’ right to a fair plea-
bargain offer.  Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the 
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular 
defendant or her defense counsel.  In the absence of such a 
right, the majority of defendants’ rights are stripped of content, 
for the majority of criminal proceedings culminate in a plea-
bargain rather than after a full trial where, presumably, 
certain defendants’ rights are upheld. 
The article proceeds as follows: Part II connects between 
modern theory of safety, which has been developed in other 
areas, and the new theory of safety from false convictions; Part 
III analyses the hazards and the accidents of convicting the 
innocents based on plea-bargains; Part IV addresses some 
possible safety measures, proposed improvements to the 
existing plea-bargains system, as well as abolition; Part V 
suggests the main innovative contribution of this article—
applying the safety STAMP model to plea-bargains in order to 
reduce the risk of false convictions; Part VI concludes. 
 
5
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The purpose of this article is threefold: (1) in general, 
adopting modern safety theory into the criminal justice system; 
(2) looking for safety measures regarding plea-bargains and, 
specifically, developing a STAMP model for safety from false 
convictions based on plea-bargains, and; (3) showing the way to 
apply this model on other hazards of false convictions. 
 
II. Safety from False Convictions 
 
It is very convenient for us to hold our criminal law system 
in high regard, to the point of calling it the “criminal justice 
system.”  It is convenient for us to think that everything runs 
as it should and even if certain doubts creep in at times, we 
tend to repress them. 
The state inflicts no greater injustice on its citizens than 
systematically falsely convicting innocents.  In the past, it was 
possible to call into question the actual occurrence of false 
convictions and consider it, at most, a negligible phenomenon.  
However, today such skepticism likely derives mainly from 
ignorance.  This is principally due to the Innocence Project and 
the DNA revolution.5  Other recent studies have shown that 
false convictions are not rare.6  These findings demand a 
renewed and more realistic consideration of the issue. 
 
5.  See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org; 
see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: 
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY 
CONVICTED (2000).  Genetic comparisons are conducted between samples 
taken from inmates and samples that have been preserved from crime scenes.  
On the basis of the testing initiated by the original Innocence Project (there 
are many similar additional projects, both in the United States and 
elsewhere), at least 350 false convictions have been exposed, regarding the 
serious offenses of rape and murder, with life imprisonment or capital 
punishment. Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (as of Apr. 16, 2018 the exact 
number of people exonerated was 356).  Moreover, in almost half of the cases, 
genetic testing led to the identification of the true perpetrators of the crimes 
who had roamed free due to the false convictions, some of them even 
continued to commit serious crimes.  Id. (as of Apr. 16, 2018 the exact 
number of real perpetrators found was 153). 
6.  See Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful Conviction: A 
Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017), for a new updated survey 
of the literature in this field. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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Empiric studies point to a very high false-conviction rate.  
According to Michael Risinger’s research, the rate of false 
convictions is five percent for the most serious crime—a rape 
followed by a murder.7  A very informative study by Samuel R. 
Gross and Michael Shaffer, entitled Exonerations in the United 
States, 1989-2012,8 includes 891 exonerations of individuals, of 
which approximately one-third were based on DNA 
comparisons, and an additional 1170 individuals cleared in 
“group exonerations”;9 altogether these amounted to a total of 
2061 official exonerations of wrongly convicted, innocent 
defendants.  In 2014, Gross et al. published a study on “Rates of 
False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to 
Death.”10  The researchers estimated that if all death-
sentenced defendants were to remain under sentence of death 
indefinitely, at least 4.1% would be exonerated, but concluded 
this to be “a conservative estimate” of the proportion of false 
convictions among death sentences in the United States, and 
that it is almost certain that the actual proportion is 
significantly higher.11  Moreover, a fascinating empirical study, 
initiated and funded by the State of Virginia, supports an even 
higher estimate of the false conviction rate – about fifteen 
percent.12 
Therefore, the false-conviction rate in the most severe 
offences can be reasonably estimated as somewhere between 
five and ten percent.  And as it is reasonable to assume that 
courts are less cautious with regard to less serious offenses 
 
7.  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified 
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779 
(2007). 
8.  SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012 (2012). 
9.  These group exonerations were in the framework of twelve different 
instances of police corruption, where in each case, police officers had 
deliberately and systematically incriminated innocent citizens with false 
claims and fabricated evidence in order to gain promotions.  Id. 
10.  SAMUEL R. GROSS, BARBARA O’BRIEN, CHEN HU & EDWARD H. 
KENNEDY, RATE OF FALSE CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WHO ARE 
SENTENCED TO DEATH 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014). 
11.  Id. at 7234. 
12.  JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING & WRONGFUL CONVICTION (2012) (research report 
submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice). 
7
SANGERO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:25 PM 
308 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
than those examined in the studies reviewed above, it is likely 
that the false-conviction rate is significantly higher than five 
percent.  As I will show later on, since in the convictions based 
on plea-bargains the commission of the crime and the guilt of 
the accused are not proved in a trial with significant evidence, 
the rate of false convictions is probably much higher. 
These numbers remove any doubt as to the occurrence of 
false convictions. The important question today is what can be 
done to diminish their incidence.  False convictions cause an 
enormous harm, not only to the innocent defendants, their 
families, and friends, but also to society.  Of course, the falsely 
convicted individual bears the primary injury in being 
convicted, the accompanying stigma, and the actual 
punishment, which can range from a monetary fine, through 
imprisonment, to loss of life in jurisdictions allowing the death 
penalty.  The harm caused by imprisonment has been studied 
for many years, but only lately have the particular harms of 
wrongful imprisonment, some irreversible, been researched.13 
There is a moral duty of society and the state to adopt 
safety measures based on social theories, such as the social 
contract theory, and legal doctrines, such as the state-created 
danger doctrine. Convicting the innocent is an enormous 
injustice. 
Many are willing to accept rare occurrence of wrongful 
convictions as an unavoidable phenomenon.  But sooner or 
later it will become common public knowledge that not only are 
false convictions not a rarity, but the law enforcement 
authorities make no significant effort to diminish their rate.  
This would shake the public confidence and trust in the 
criminal law enforcement system, which is still referred to as 
 
13.  Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing Innocents: The 
Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 259 
(2010).  For the difficulties faced by exonerees after their release, see also 
JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 590–606 (2011); Mary C. Delaney, Keith A. Findley & 
Sheila Sullivan, Exonerees’ Hardships after Freedom, WIS. LAW. Feb. 2010, at 
18; Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful 
Conviction, AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF, SPRING 2010, AT 10; Heather Weigand, 
Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and Exonerated, 18 PUB. INT. 
L.J. 427 (2009). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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the “criminal justice system.”  Even disregarding due process,14 
if we want to preserve public faith in the criminal justice 
system so that it can continue to perform its function of crime 
control, it is vital that safety standards be implemented to 
decrease the rate of false convictions. 
Social contract theory also provides a rationale for a moral 
duty of the state to institute safety in the criminal justice 
system: the state was created in order to safeguard the rights 
of society’s members, not to cause them suffer.15  Thus the 
state, as the creator of the risk of false convictions, bears a 
huge moral duty in the context of criminal justice—as 
compared to other contexts—to take safety measures to reduce 
this risk.  Yet beyond its theoretical declaration that guilt must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the state makes no 
meaningful attempt to reduce the risk of an innocent person 
being falsely convicted.16  Criminal law lacks even the most 
basic concept of modern system-safety,17 with not even the 
most basic and simple safety measures to reduce the risk of 
false convictions. 
On this background, this article offers ways of reducing the 
false conviction rate.  The view advanced here is that the 
criminal justice system can be categorized as what is termed in 
safety engineering a “safety-critical system.”18  Since such 
systems involve matters of life and death, any system error 
might likely cause severe harm to both individuals and society.  
A false conviction is a system error and accident just like a 
plane crash, not only metaphorically but also in the realistic 
terms of economic cost.19  The article argues for the creation 
 
14.  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–73 
(1968). 
15.  See Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 
1172–79, 1186–87 (2003); Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1303. 
16.  Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1303. 
17.  For some groundbreaking articles in this direction, however, see 
James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); James M. Doyle, An Etiology of Wrongful 
Convictions: Error, Safety, and Forward-Looking Accountability in Criminal 
Justice, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING 
JUSTICE 56 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014); From a Plane 
Crash, supra note 2; Safety Doctrine, supra note 3.  
18     . See From a Plane Crash, supra note 2. 
19.  Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1304–05. 
9
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and application of a safety theory in the criminal justice 
system, specifically regarding plea-bargains. 
Modern safety began to develop following World War II.  
Until then, the safety approach in the field of aviation had been 
“Fly-Fix-Fly”: (1) an airplane would be flown until an accident 
occurred; (2) the causes of the accident would be investigated 
and the defects repaired; and (3) the airplane would resume 
flight.  This method was based on a system of learning from 
past experience to repair product defects and flaws and prevent 
future mishaps.  But such a system does not safeguard against 
future mishaps that can be caused by other, undetected defects.  
This approach became clearly inadequate with the rapid 
advances in aviation technology and rising costs of airplanes.  
This made learning from experience too expensive, leading to a 
shift in approach seven decades ago, and the birth of modern 
safety.20 
The primary safety objective became preventing accidents 
before they occurred, thereby avoiding the high costs of 
learning through experience.  The “Fly-Fix-Fly” approach was 
replaced by the “Identify-Analyze-Control” method, with its 
aim of “First-Time-Safe.”  Under the latter approach: (1) there 
is systematic identification of future hazards; (2) the 
probability of the hazards occurrence is analyzed; and (3) a 
complete neutralization of the risk or at least its reduction to 
an acceptable level.21 
Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented 
in other fields as well, such as engineering and transportation, 
and later on, in medicine and labor.  These safety systems are 
constructed on safety education and training, a culture of 
safety, a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents 
(near-accidents), professional risk assessment, a process of 
perpetual improvement, and the understanding that safety in 
each component is not sufficient for achieving system safety. 
This First-Time-Safe approach should be adopted in the 
criminal justice system.  The legal system should–and can–
learn from the engineering field.  For example, there is a duty 
in engineering safety to report not only accidents but also 
 
20.  Id. at 1296–97. 
21.  Id. at 1297. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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“incidents,” defined as situations in which there was potential 
for harm to be caused and it was averted by coincidence.  Near-
miss conditions, if not rectified, most likely will develop into 
accidents at a later point.  In contrast, in criminal law 
“incidents” are completely ignored and even accidents are not 
always investigated.22 
The three basic stages of the system-safety process are: 
Identify, Analyze, and Control.  Risk assessment is vital, for it 
produces meaningful data to guide in prioritizing hazards, 
allocating resources, and evaluating the acceptability of risks 
associated with these hazards.  The most progressive system-
safety method currently applied is known as “System-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes” or “STAMP.”23  This article 
develops a way to use this model regarding plea-bargains.  It 
demonstrates how the fundamentally important Identify-
Analyze-Control method can and should be implemented in the 
system, using Leveson’s STAMP model. 
The obvious question that arises is why safety measures 
have not been implemented in criminal law.  Moreover, why 
has the system never even adopted a Fly-Fix-Fly approach?  
The answers to these questions are related to the general 
inability to detect the occurrence of false convictions, which are 
typically indiscernible.  This accounts the optimistic false belief 
that false convictions are a very rare phenomenon.  Despite 
indications of a high rate of false convictions, policymakers and 
the public alike are certain and confident that the system 
performs well and that there is no need to invest resources in 
safety measures.24  This aspect of criminal law is so 
fundamental that it amounts to a principle: the “Hidden 
Accidents Principle” of the criminal justice system.25 
According to the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal 
law, an effective feedback for the criminal justice system is 
implausible, even in theory.  Therefore, the only way to 
 
22.  Id. at 1299. 
23.  NANCY G. LEVESON, ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS THINKING 
APPLIED TO SAFETY 7–14 (2011). 
24.  Another possible explanation is the erroneous idea that whereas 
unsafe airplanes pose a risk to all of “us,” an unsafe criminal justice system is 
a risk only to “them”—that is, potential criminals. 
25.  Safety Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1314–16. 
11
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introduce safety into this system is through learning from 
fields in which mishaps are seen and can be detected.  The 
Hidden Accidents Principle is evidence of the inadequacy of the 
Fly-Fix-Fly safety method for criminal law, because of the 
impossibility of learning from the experience of past accidents 
in the system when they are a hidden phenomenon. 
Therefore, after a deep discussion of one of the most 
serious hazards in criminal law—the hazard of false 
convictions based on plea-bargains—I shall develop a specific 
safety model, based on these discussions and on the STAMP 
model. 
 
III. The Hazard of False Convictions Based on Plea-Bargains 
 
In a plea-bargain arrangement, the defendant agrees to 
admit to the facts that constitute a particular offense, and in 
exchange, the prosecution agrees not to charge the defendant 
with a more serious offense or agrees to a lighter sentence than 
could be expected following conviction at trial.26 
Advocates of plea-bargains27 stress efficiency 
considerations,28 claiming that the state in this way saves the 
resources it would spend on conducting a full trial, which can 
be channeled to law enforcement, thereby increasing 
deterrence.  They further argue that defendants also derive 
utility from this; under the (not clear-cut) assumption that they 
act rationally, defendants multiply their chances of conviction 
by the expected sentence at the end of a trial, compare the 
 
26.  See William F. McDonald, From Plea Negotiation to Coercive Justice: 
Notes on the Respecification of a Concept, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385 (1979) 
(discussing different definitions of “plea bargains”).  For the history and 
development of plea bargains, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and 
Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the 
Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261 (1979). 
27.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 
101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Alan Wertheimer, The 
Prosecutor and the Gunman, 89 ETHICS 269 (1979). 
28.  See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, in 
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 164 (Gary S. Becker & 
William M. Landes eds., 1974) (discussing an economic analysis of plea-
bargains); see also Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. 
REV. 695, 704-05 (2001) (discussing efficiency considerations).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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result to the offer made by the prosecution, and decide whether 
it is worthwhile for them to confess in a plea-bargain or go to 
trial.  Under this argument, the plea-bargain system gives the 
defendant an additional option and, thereby, works in their 
favor.29  In addition, defendants are spared the tension of a 
trial and the uncertainty as to their future, as well as saving 
heavy legal representation costs.30  The premise guiding some 
of the proponents of plea-bargains is that they are made in “the 
shadow of the trial” and, therefore, very closely approximate 
the anticipated outcome at trial, while saving the resources 
necessary to arrive at that outcome.31 
However, when a defendant waives his right to a full trial 
and suffices with conviction in a plea-bargain, he is also 
waiving the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which is one of the principal mechanisms for preventing 
false convictions.32  This relates to the risk that the wide gap 
between the defendant’s anticipated punishment if convicted 
at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he confesses in 
the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty, but also the 
innocent, who are unwilling to take the risk of conviction at 
trial, to confessing.33 
 
29.  John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady 
and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 490 (2001).  
30   . Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
31.  Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). 
32  . See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and Negotiated Plea, 86 
ETHICS 93, 106 (1976); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 27, at 1909-10 (“Most legal 
scholars oppose plea bargaining, finding it both inefficient and unjust. 
Nevertheless, most participants in the plea bargaining process, including 
(perhaps especially) the courts, seem remarkably untroubled by it”).  
33.  A well-known example of precisely this dilemma was raised by 
Albert Alschuler in his seminal article.  See Albert Alshuler, The Prosecutor’s 
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61 (1968) (a defendant accused 
of rape who was likely innocent told his lawyer that he will accept the 
prosecution’s offer to reduce the charges to assault, which was made because 
they had no significant evidence against him, because he could not risk being 
convicted of rape).  See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as 
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 
2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship between Plea Bargaining and 
Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 653–55 (2011) (describing the 
outrageous case of Lea Fastow, who was forced to choose between short 
imprisonment before the long imprisonment of her husband and the risk of 
their both being sentenced to long, parallel imprisonments, which would have 
13
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Thomas described this problematic situation as ultimately 
deriving from the “failure to screen weak cases, many of which 
will involve innocent defendants, out of the system” and 
allowing prosecutors “free rein to offer very favorable plea 
bargains to get convictions when the case is weak. . . . 
American plea bargaining thus creates huge incentives for 
innocent people to plead guilty.”34  Thomas noted that society’s 
“acceptance of this risk” leads to a prioritization of case-
resolution over truth-finding.35  Plea-bargains, he stated, 
remain “a troubling phenomenon” because they are “covert and 
informal”; thus there is no way of knowing “how many innocent 
defendants are ‘sweet talked’ into pleading guilty.”36  In a 
similar vein, the English Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (“Runciman Commission”) Report stated, “it would be 
naive to suppose that innocent persons never plead guilty 
because of the prospect of the sentence discount.”37 
In the past, plea-bargaining was officially prohibited as a 
practice.38  This prohibition was the legal expression of the 
morally questionable light in which many view plea-bargains, 
seen as distancing the law from justice.39  On this background, 
 
left their two young children without either of their parents); see Albert W. 
Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. 
REV. 919 (2016).   
34.  GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008). 
35.  Id. at 12 (quoting, on this point, Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of 
Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1585, 1613 (2005)). 
36.  Id. at 204. 
37.  ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, 
at 110 (UK) [hereinafter Runciman, COMMISSION REPORT]. 
38.  Kipnis, supra note 32, at 101.  Kipnis compares the plea-bargain to 
a situation in which an instructor suggests to a student that instead of 
bothering to mark the student’s paper  (which, from glancing at the first 
page, the instructor estimates would get a D-grade), the student can waive 
his right to having his paper checked and receive a B, the student agrees to 
this.  Id. at 104–05. 
39.  The waiving of the truth-finding process and the experience of doing 
justice is most prominent in the “Alford” and “nolo contendere” pleas.  In the 
former, the defendant admits to the existence of sufficient evidence to convict 
him but asserts his innocence, in the latter, the defendant does not admit 
guilt but is willing to bear the punishment.  See Stephanos Bibas, 
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The 
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003); 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
that judges ensure the voluntariness of a plea of guilty in the 
framework of a plea-bargain, by “address[ing] the defendant 
personally in open court . . . determin[ing] that the plea is 
voluntary and did not result of force . . . or promises apart from 
a plea agreement.”40  In its seminal 1970 Brady decision,41 the 
Supreme Court ruled that even consent due to fear of the death 
penalty is to be considered voluntary, but at the same time, set 
certain limitations on plea-bargains: a plea-bargain can be 
made only when the evidence is overwhelming and the 
defendant unlikely to succeed at trial and can benefit from the 
opportunity to negotiate for a reduced sentence.  Plea-
bargaining, the Court further ruled, cannot be used to 
overwhelm defendants and force them to plead guilty when 
their guilt is uncertain.  Finally, the Court stressed that if 
these constitutional limitations are not abided by, it would 
reconsider its approval of the plea-bargaining system.42 
The Brady rule ultimately failed, however.  Today, it is 
generally acknowledged that innocent defendants are offered 
great enticements to falsely confess.  Sometimes, everyone puts 
pressure on the defendant to confess: the prosecutor, the judge, 
and even the defense counsel.43  This problem is further 
exacerbated by a potential conflict of interest and agency 
problem with the defense attorney (it is usually in the latter’s 
best interest to convince her client to agree to a plea-bargain 
given the extensive work required by going to trial) and with 
the prosecuting attorney (prosecutors have personal 
considerations, such as career-advancement,44 that could divert 
 
Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The 
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 (2003); 
Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining 
System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425 (2003). 
40.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). 
41.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
42.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-58; see also Dervan, supra note 33, at 651-53. 
43.  See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3 (1978) (claiming that torture and plea-bargaining are the criminal 
system’s response to the failure of criminal procedure to address the needs of 
law enforcement). 
44.  Susan A. Bandes, Protecting the Innocent as the Primary Value of 
the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 437 (2009) (reviewing 
15
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them from the public interest).  As Stephen J. Schulhofer has 
shown, the agency costs of plea-bargains are significant.45  
Judicial discretion to reject a plea-bargain is too narrow; 
prosecutorial discretion to make a plea-bargain is too broad 
and powerful,46 and is used to pressure defendants into 
pleading guilty or facing severe sentences.47  Moreover, the 
existing mechanisms for preventing unfounded prosecutions—
namely, grand juries and preliminary hearings—are 
ineffective.48  Grand jury proceedings are not presided over by a 
judge, and the defendant and counsel are not even present 
during the proceedings.  All the prosecutor has to do is to 
persuade the grand jury of probable cause, bringing to mind 
the famous quip (attributed to a judge) that any prosecutor can 
get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.”49  Prosecutors also 
suffer from “self-serving bias.”  The nature of their job leads 
them to conclude that defendants are guilty and to offer plea-
bargains that reflect that assessment.50  This can account for 
the practice of overcharging as a means of pressuring 
defendants to agree to a plea-bargain,51 which is, in essence, 
blackmail. 
In a plea-bargain system, it is sufficient for the case to be 
closed with a conviction that the defendant confessed.  It is 
quite ironic that a common justification for offering a plea-
bargain is that the prosecution lacks strong enough evidence to 
convict at trial.  Consequently, the reality is that false 
 
GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN 
JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008)); THOMAS, supra 
note 34. 
45.  Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1987-91. 
46.  See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: 
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37; see also 
THOMAS, supra note 34, at 204-05. 
47.  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422-25 (2008). 
48.  Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2295, 2349 (2006); Craig M. Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE—A WORLDWIDE STUDY 540–41 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2007). 
49.  THOMAS, supra note 34, at 30, 172, 202–04. 
50.  Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining 
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997). 
51.  Gifford, supra note 46, at 47–49; see also Cynthia Alkon, Hard 
Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. 
L.J. 401, 406-413 (2017).  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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convictions also occur when defendants confess in the 
framework of a plea-bargain.52  Indeed, plea-bargains are one 
of the central mechanisms facilitating false convictions.  This 
system is a veritable convictions industry, of both the innocent 
and guilty.  There is, of course, a close correlation between the 
high rate of convictions53 and the rate of plea-bargains, which 
operates in both directions: on the one hand, as with plea 
bargains, the outcome is, by definition, conviction and not 
acquittal, they obviously contribute to the high conviction rate.  
On the other hand, as the rate of convictions is high, it is not 
surprising that almost all defendants prefer to confess in a 
plea-bargain, regardless of actual guilt or innocence, having 
lost hope of acquittal at trial. 
To illustrate, in cases of widespread police corruption, such 
as the Los Angeles Police Department Rampart scandal54 and 
Tulia scandal,55 in which scores of innocent defendants were 
charged and brought to trial, the majority of the defendants 
pleaded guilty.  In the Rampart scandal, for example, a corrupt 
police detective revealed how he and his colleagues had 
incriminated defendants by fabricating evidence and giving 
false testimony, among other things.  Over a hundred 
defendants were convicted this way, with most pleading guilty 
to the charges.  In the Tulia scandal, thirty-nine defendants 
were tried for drug offenses based on a single false testimony 
given by an undercover police detective.  Most of these 
defendants pleaded guilty and were convicted.56 
 
 
52.  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 
(2008).  In a study conducted in Virginia, all cases in which DNA samples had 
been preserved in the laboratory were examined, without distinguishing 
between cases in which a plea bargain had been reached and those that went 
to trial.  An examination of the DNA samples revealed that of those 
defendants who had agreed to a plea-bargain, some were also wrongly 
convicted.  JOHN ROMAN, KELLY WALSH, PAMELA LACHMAN & JENNIFER 
YAHNER, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION 4 n.6 
(2012) (research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice). 
53.  Thus, for example, the acquittal rate in 2002 stood at 1%.  THOMAS, 
supra note 34, at 204. 
54.  Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 
through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 534–36 (2005). 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
17
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The Rampart and Tulia corruption cases prove that a very 
troublesome situation arises with plea bargains.  Eighty-one 
percent of those convicted confessed in a plea-bargain, despite 
their actual innocence.  Should they have done otherwise?  Not 
necessarily.  In the Tulia case, for example, a defendant who 
falsely confessed in a plea-bargain received, on average, a four-
year prison sentence, as opposed to fifty-one years for a 
defendant who maintained innocence.57  The system thus 
imposes a heavy quasi-fine on those who insist on going to 
trial; a defendant who maintains his innocence is harshly 
punished, which impels the majority of defendants to confess 
regardless of actual guilt or innocence.  In its recent Frye 
decision, the Supreme Court noted this phenomenon, citing 
Barkow: “[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose 
receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor 
might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on 
the books largely for bargaining purposes.”58  Yet for some 
inexplicable reason, the Court did not express any outrage over 
this reality of heavy “trial penalties.” 
Apart from the exceptional cases that were exposed, such 
as Tulia and Rampart, usually plea-bargains serve the Hidden 
Accidents Principle in criminal law, according to which false 
convictions are usually never detected.  Oren Gazal-Ayal and 
Avishalom Tor conducted an interesting empirical study of the 
rate of innocent defendants who confess in the framework of a 
plea-bargain.59  Using data from the Innocence Project 
gathered by Gross et al.,60 they compiled and examined a 
dataset of 466 exonerations based on new information pointing 
to the defendants’ factual innocence.  In 284 of the cases, the 
conviction was vacated based on DNA evidence, with the actual 
offender identified in ninety-six of the cases.61  The authors 
 
57.  Russell D. Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the Causes of 
Wrongful Convictions 28 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1881767.  
58.  See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Rachel E. 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1034 (2006)). 
59.  Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 339 (2012). 
60.  See Gross et al., supra note 54. 
61.  Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 59, at 351–52. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/3
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arrived at two noteworthy findings.  The one was that although 
the rate of plea bargains during the relevant period for similar 
crimes was approximately 90%, in only 7.9% of the exoneration 
cases examined in the study had the defendants originally 
confessed in a plea bargain.62  The authors inferred from this 
(as well as from two earlier experimental studies)63 what they 
term the “innocence effect,” where in contrast to what is 
commonly presumed under the “looming shadow of the trial 
theory,” here innocent defendants emerged as tending not to 
confess in a plea-bargain and preferring to go to trial.64  The 
authors’ second intriguing finding, which derived from the 
first, is that as the innocent do not tend to agree to a plea 
bargain, those who are convicted at trial receive particularly 
harsh sentences.  Thus, according to this study’s findings, 
although the rate of false convictions caused by plea-bargains 
is lower than what is generally thought, the plea-bargaining 
system nonetheless works to the detriment of innocent 
defendants in that it results in harsh sentences if they are 
convicted at trial—far harsher than those received by guilty 
defendants who agree to a plea bargain.65 
There is, however, a methodological flaw to this interesting 
study.  It is generally extremely difficult for someone who has 
been falsely convicted to obtain an exoneration, and even more 
so if he confessed, regardless of whether in a plea-bargain or 
not.  Given a confession, exoneration will likely require 
scientific findings supporting the defendant’s innocence,66 and 
at times, even DNA findings will not suffice.67  Accordingly, it 
is reasonable to assume that the rate of exoneration of 
defendants wrongly convicted in the framework of a plea-
bargain is significantly lower than the rate of exoneration for 
defendants wrongly convicted after a full trial.  Therefore, the 
 
62.  Id. at 352. 
63.  Id. at 359–62. 
64.  Id. at 345. 
65.  Id. at 347–48. 
66.  Garrett, supra note 52, at 91. 
67.  Thus, for example, George Allen was imprisoned for a number of 
years even after DNA evidence supporting his innocence had been found.  See 
Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View of a 
Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for 
Key Evidence, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 511, 533 (2011). 
19
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fact that the exonerations studied by the authors included only 
a few cases involving a plea-bargain is not an indication that 
innocent defendants do not tend to agree to plea bargains, nor 
does it imply that the plea-bargaining system does not lead to 
many false convictions.68  However, what this study does reveal 
is a compelling need for additional empirical research of plea-
bargains in the criminal justice system as one of the first steps 
toward making the system safer. 
Last, as Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar have shown, 
the assumption that without a plea-deal, defendants will be 
forced to go to trial is completely erroneous, for the prosecution 
does not have sufficient resources to conduct a trial for every 
indictment it files, but rather only for a small minority of cases.  
In practice, only three percent of all federal cases go to trial, 
and only six percent of state cases.69  In the remainder, 
conviction is obtained through plea-bargaining.  Without this 
system, and given the level of resources currently available to 
the prosecution, prosecutors would not be able to indict the 
majority of suspects and would have to instead do significant 
prescreening before charging suspects.70  The screening process 
would likely take into account the severity of the offense in 
question (applying a standard resembling the de minimis 
doctrine, for example) and the strength of the evidence in each 
case.  It can be assumed that in many cases, the evidence 
against an innocent defendant will be weaker than the 
evidence against another defendant; without the option of plea-
bargaining, then, many cases against innocent defendants will 
not go to trial and will be closed.  Hence, we can see how the 
 
68.  Another argument was raised by Gross.  See Samuel R. Gross, 
Pretrial Incentives, Post-conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal 
Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2011–
2012) (“[T]he individual exonerations we know about consist almost entirely 
of a subset of the most serious false convictions for rape and murder.  
Inevitably, they underrepresent guilty pleas because most available resources 
(of courts as well as innocence projects and other defense attorneys) are 
devoted to potentially innocent defendants who have been sentenced to death 
or very long prison terms, and such sentences are much less likely after a 
plea bargain than after a trial.”). 
69.  See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Lafler v. 
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).  
70.  Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) 
Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009); see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 48.  
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plea-bargaining system is what facilitates the indictment of 
many defendants, and without this system, it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority would never be charged.  Under this 
analysis, it seems patently wrong to presume that the plea-
bargain system works to the benefit of defendants as a group—
although it is possible that it works in favor of specific 
defendants in specific cases. 
 
IV. Safety Measures 
 
It is important to distinguish between a comprehensive 
transformation that does away with plea-bargaining 
altogether, and proposals for specific changes and 
improvements to the existing plea-bargain system.  The article 
first reviews some of the proposals made for improving the 
present situation, and will then consider the possibility of 
completely abolishing the plea-bargain system.  I will stress 
that so long as there is no reporting duty, database, or 
empirical studies examining the effectiveness of the proposed 
changes in improving the system, we can only surmise as to 
whether they attain their goals.  Accordingly, even if a 
particular proposal is adopted, modern safety theory requires 
that its impact on the system be assessed in order to decide 
whether to continue in its implementation. 
 
 A. Proposed Improvements to the Plea-Bargain System 
 
First, there is an urgent need to strengthen the current 
prescreening procedures for indictments,71 with regard to all 
offenses and not only serious crimes.72  Indeed, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt cannot be expected in the framework of a plea 
bargain.  However, it is, nonetheless, possible to require, in a 
law, that the police and prosecution investigation files be 
submitted to the court for review of whether the evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt meets at least the preponderance of evidence 
 
71.  Gifford, supra note 46, at 48. See also THOMAS, supra note 34, at 
184, 198–202. 
72.  John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor 
Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 
(1977). 
21
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(“fifty-one percent”) standard.73 
Second, so long as the system revolves around plea 
bargains—ninety-seven percent of convictions in federal 
criminal proceedings and ninety-four percent of the convictions 
in state proceedings are obtained through plea-bargaining74—
the article proposes recognizing defendant’s right to a fair plea-
bargain offer.75  Plea bargains need not be dependent on the 
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular 
defendant or her defense counsel.76  In the absence of such a 
right, the majority of defendants’ rights are stripped of 
content, for the majority of criminal proceedings culminate in a 
plea-bargain rather than after a full trial, where presumably, 
certain defendants’ rights are upheld.  If a right to a fair plea-
bargain offer is not recognized as part of due process, then the 
right to a fair trial recedes ex ante to apply in only three 
percent of criminal proceedings in the federal system and six 
percent in the state system, and the U.S. Constitution becomes 
virtually irrelevant in all the other criminal proceedings.77 
 
73.  THOMAS, supra note 34, at 199; Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva 
Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, 
15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 84-85 (2014) (in German law, “[j]udges receive, even 
before trial, the investigative file containing all the evidence gathered by the 
police and the prosecution. . . . Even a full confession made by the defendant 
in open court does not necessarily relieve the court of the duty to ‘discover 
the truth.’”). 
74.  See Frye, 566 U.S. at 134; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (noting “the reality 
that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system 
of trials”). 
75.  In the Supreme Court case law, the premise is that the accused is 
not entitled to such a right and that the prosecution has very broad discretion 
in this context.  See Frye, 566 U.S. at 134; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170. 
76.  Under current law, the prosecution is not “under any obligation” to 
engage in any type of bargaining.  See Bradley, supra note 48, at 543.  For a 
suggestion of relevant considerations that a prosecutor should take into 
account, see Aditi Juneja, A Holistic Framework to Aid Responsible Plea-
Bargaining by Prosecutors, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 600 (2017).  See also 
Alkon, supra note 51. 
77.  It appears that adopting this proposal would also solve the problem 
of the anomaly created by the majority opinion, which Justice Scalia pointed 
out in Lafler and Frye.  See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Frye, 566 U.S. at 151 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  On the one hand, the majority 
justices assumed that the defendant does not have a right to receive any sort 
of plea-bargain offer from the prosecution, but on the other hand, they held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends also to the negotiations 
leading up to the plea-deal.  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 156; Frye, 566 U.S. at 134.  
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Third, also necessary, is supervision of the prosecution’s 
policy for determining the divergence between the punishment 
offered in a plea-deal and that expected if convicted at trial, so 
as to prevent the enticement of the innocent to confess.  In 
practice, when the prosecution offers a defendant a much 
lighter punishment relative to the punishment expected if 
convicted after a full trial, this is a strong indication that it 
lacks significant evidence against the defendant (although 
there are, of course, other possible reasons for a lenient offer), 
which points to a high likelihood of the defendant’s innocence.  
In such circumstances, optimally the prosecution should not 
indict the defendant and try to get a conviction by offering a 
lenient plea-deal.  Given this, Gazal-Ayal suggests a “partial 
ban on plea bargains,” so that courts will reject overly lenient 
ones.  In his estimation, this would influence prosecutorial 
screening decisions and lead to a substantial decrease in the 
number of weak cases that prosecutors pursue.78 
In German law, it is accepted that courts supervise the gap 
between the punishment offered to defendants in a plea-
bargain and the punishment he can expect to receive if 
convicted at trial, and they do not accept overly lenient plea-
deals that could serve to entice the innocent to confess.79  
Another practical way of achieving such result is to establish 
an external body to supervise prosecutors, given their 
tremendous power and the prevalence of false convictions.  
There should also be adoption of a policy not to make plea-
bargains when there is no significant evidence of the 
 
Thus, if this right was violated due to ineffective counsel (as in Lafler), and as 
a result, the case went to full trial, it is possible that in appeal, the verdict 
will be vacated and the court will order the prosecution to remake its plea-
offer. If the right to counsel was violated due to ineffective counsel (as in 
Frye), and as a result the defendant was never informed of the prosecution’s 
lenient plea-offer and later agreed to a harsher deal, it is possible that on 
appeal the court will vacate the verdict that give force to the harsher plea-
bargain.  In Frye, the defense counsel failed to inform the defendant of the 
plea-offer.  Frye, 566 U.S. at 134.  After the offer lapsed, the defendant still 
pleaded guilty, but on more severe terms.  Id.  In Lafler, the client was 
informed of the favorable plea-offer but, on bad advice from counsel, rejected 
the offer, and in a full trial before a jury, he received a much harsher 
sentence than had been offered in the plea-bargain.  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 156.  
See also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). 
78.  Gazal-Ayal, supra note 48, at 2300. 
79.  See Weigend & Turner, supra note 73, at 84-85. 
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defendant’s guilt.  In addition, Gazal-Ayal and Tor also propose 
restricting trial penalties,80 that is to say, constraining judges 
in giving harsher sentences to defendants who chose not to 
waive their right to a trial.  Diminishing this practice will also 
ex ante reduce the temptation for the innocent to confess in a 
plea-bargain due to the wide disparity between the plea-
bargain punishment and expected punishment if convicted at 
trial.  It will also, moreover, alleviate the injustice caused to 
innocent defendants who choose to go to trial and are convicted. 
Schulhofer has suggested two important proposals for 
specific improvements to the current situation.  The first is to 
expand pretrial discovery to approximate the civil model, “so 
that negotiating parties could more accurately estimate ex ante 
the likelihood of conviction at trial.”81  The second proposal—
the more critical one in his opinion—is that the economic 
relationship between the defense attorney and his or her client 
be restructured.82  For example, when defense attorneys receive 
the same fee for a case that ends quickly in a plea-bargain and 
a case that ends only after trial and requires considerably more 
work, they have a stronger incentive to reach a plea-bargain 
and convince the client not to go to trial.  This asymmetry in 
representation in criminal proceedings has been depicted in the 
literature as “a contest between underfunded (and, too often, 
ineffective) defense attorneys and prosecutors who tend to 
believe that their duty to win supersedes their duty to do 
justice”;83 moreover, “the imbalance is so pervasive in the 
United States that it might be treated as a structural error.”84  
Yet Schulhofer’s most important recommendation does not 
relate to specific improvements of the system but, rather, the 
abolition of the system in its entirety. 
 
80.  Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 59, at 395. 
81.  Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1998; see also Andrew D. Leipold, How 
Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1123, 1151–52 (2005); but see Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1972. 
82.  Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1998–99; see also Easterbrook, supra 
note 27, at 1973–74. 
83.  Bandes, supra note 40, at 426; see also THOMAS, supra note 34, at 
170–71. 
84.  Marvin Zalman, The Adversary System and Wrongful Conviction, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE 72, 79-80 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008). 
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 B. Abolition 
 
Four well-known but very different descriptions of the 
plea-bargain system have been suggested in the literature.  
Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz have described it as a 
contract,85 while Frank H. Easterbrook described it as a 
compromise.86  John H. Langbein, in turn, compared it to 
(modern) torture: just as in medieval Europe, the accused had 
to choose between confessing and torture, today, defendants 
have to choose between pleading guilty and receiving a lenient 
penalty and going to trial and risking a long jail-term or even 
life imprisonment.87  Finally, Schulhofer calls the plea-bargain 
system a disaster.88  All four of these descriptions are thought-
provoking.  The first two, however, are applicable only with 
regard to a guilty defendant, for when an innocent person has 
been wrongly accused, the plea-bargain is a very unfair 
contract, and in no way a compromise but rather a terrible 
submission.  When a defendant is innocent (and, probably, also 
in the case of a guilty defendant), plea-bargaining can be a 
terrible infliction of psychological torture.  The law-
enforcement system is unable to distinguish in advance 
between the guilty and the innocent and, in fact, does not even 
make a serious attempt at doing so; it therefore, offers plea-
bargains to both the guilty and innocent.  I thus hold that the 
plea-bargain system in its entirety is truly a disaster, 
particularly from the perspective of the need for safety from 
false convictions.  Indeed, it is an anti-safety system. 
Because the plea-bargain system is an anti-safety system, 
I view it as a disaster, like Schulhofer and other scholars.89  
This is a system that should be abolished because, among other 
reasons, it leads to false convictions and fosters over-
criminalization.  Schulhofer has distinguished between two 
 
85.  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 27. 
86.  Easterbrook, supra note 27. 
87.  Langbein, supra note 39. 
88.  Schulhofer, supra note 33. 
89.  See id. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining 
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Is Plea Bargaining 
Inevitable?]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981). 
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possible levels of abolition.90  The first level is the abolition of 
concessions, which would eliminate all incentives for 
defendants to waive their right to trial; the second level is the 
abolition only of bargaining, so that concessions for pleas could 
still be offered, but they would be nonnegotiable incentives set 
in a statute or court rules.91  Schulhofer compellingly 
demonstrated that although abolition of bargaining is certainly 
an attractive, low-cost solution, abolishing concessions 
altogether is a no less-viable, albeit more costly, strategy.92 
How is it possible to abolish—either partially or fully—the 
plea-bargain system?  Two possible ways that immediately 
come to mind are through legislation and through judicial 
rulings.  Internalizing the need for safety in the criminal 
justice system in order to reduce the extent of false convictions 
requires that Congress, state legislatures, and judges act to 
eliminate the plea-bargain system or, at the very least, 
significantly restrict its scope.  But there is also a third 
possible way of bringing about the abolition of the system: 
through an alliance of attorneys and defendants.  As explained 
by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, there is a certain paradox in the 
fact that despite common knowledge of the limited resources 
available to the prosecution, which means it cannot actually 
carry out its threat against all defendants and bring them all to 
trial, this threat nonetheless succeeds in the overwhelming 
majority of cases: defendants almost always agree to a plea-
bargain.93  The authors explain this with the prisoner’s 
dilemma model: even though the plea-bargain system worsens 
the situation of defendants as a population (for without the 
ability to plea-bargain, the prosecution would be forced due to a 
lack of necessary resources to forgo the majority of 
indictments), every individual defendant is still likely to think 
that in his specific case, a plea bargain is to his advantage.94  
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar address the possibility of defendants 
 
90.  Schulhofer, supra note 33. 
91.  See THOMAS, supra note 34, at 207 (suggesting similarly that a 
magistrate judge be in control of the process leading to a guilty plea and 
thereby “the coercion and unequal bargaining power that infects the 
American plea-bargaining system” will be avoided). 
92.  Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 2003–09. 
93.  Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 70, at 739, 744–46. 
94.  Id. at 746–65. 
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and attorneys—particularly public defenders—organizing to 
take a stand against the system in its entirety, or at least 
against harsh plea-bargains.  In their opinion, however, such 
an endeavor would likely fail, primarily due to what Bar-Gill 
and Ben-Shahar describe as a collective action problem.95  
While I agree with the majority of Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s 
analysis, I contest their premise that the public defender’s 
fiduciary duty toward a certain client may preclude such an 
organized effort.  In my view, the public defender owes a 
fiduciary duty not only to each individual client but also to the 
entire population of defendants; it is possible, therefore, based 
on this latter duty, to break the vicious cycle of plea-bargains.  
The avenues explored by the authors, such as having willing 
defendants sign a letter of agreement not to accept a plea-deal, 
are, in my estimation, likely to succeed.96  At the very least, 
they should be attempted. If the current reality in which 
millions of defendants, in the face of prosecutors’ threats, are 
compelled to confess to the crimes they are accused of and 
waive a full trial is seen as an injustice to defendants (at least 
the innocent ones) by the law-enforcement system, then 
defense attorneys should not counsel defendants to accept plea-
bargains and thereby assist prosecutors. 
Finally, it is important to respond to the counterargument 
that the criminal law-enforcement system would collapse 
without plea bargains.  The relationship between plea-bargains 
and over-criminalization is a reciprocal one.97  On the one 
hand, plea bargains have allowed for a multiplicity of 
proceedings; on the other hand, as the system currently 
conducts too many proceedings, it is now incapable of doing so 
by determining guilt at trial and without plea-bargains.  The 
criminal law has grown to monstrous proportions: it has taken 
over our lives.  There is an erroneous presumption that every 
realm of life can be arranged by the criminal law, which was 
originally intended, of course, to address only the most 
dangerous antisocial phenomena.  When anything can be 
considered criminal (the Talmudic phrase “tafasta merube lo 
tafasta” comes to mind—if you have seized too much, you have 
 
95.  Id. at 758–65. 
96.  Id. at 760–65. 
97.  Dervan, supra note 33. 
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not seized anything at all), the stigma and shame of a criminal 
conviction fades: too many people are being deemed criminals.98 
With the realization that the plea-bargains enabling 
millions of easy convictions annually have generated a process 
of over-criminalization, the threat of the collapse of the system 
becomes less alarming.  Nothing, in my opinion, will collapse if 
the plea-bargain system is abolished or at least significantly 
constricted.  Prosecutors will be forced to set priorities and 
focus on enforcing offenses that are genuinely criminal in 
nature99 and supported by strong evidence, and they will cease 
to use the criminal law to hound citizens over trivial matters.  
At the same time, constraining the plea-bargain industry will 
mean a return to a proper attempt at conducting full trials of 
justice.  The phenomenon of wholesale convictions without any 
attempt at verifying defendants’ guilt will come to an end.100  
And last, significant progress will be made toward a safer law-
enforcement system. 
 
V. Applying the STAMP Model to Plea-Bargains 
 
 A. General 
 
If the central recommendation of this article is adopted—
namely, the abolition of the plea-bargains system—there will 
presumably be no need for a safety model for this system.  
Indeed, abolition of the plea-bargain system is the ultimate 
 
98.  See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, in BLAME 
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1987); JONATHAN SIMON, 
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); GO DIRECTLY 
TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004). 
99.  See also Kipnis, supra note 31, at 106. 
100.  An additional possible counterargument is that, in the reality of 
full trials, defendants—including innocent falsely convicted defendants—will 
receive more severe sentences, for the courts currently give harsher 
punishments than those attained in plea-bargains.  However, as Schulhofer 
rightly shows, as correction facility resources are limited, the level of the 
court-decreed punishments can be expected to drop to the current level of 
punishments offered in plea-deals.  Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 2007–08.  
Moreover, those who refuse to waive their right to a full trial will no longer be 
punished for this choice. 
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safety solution for the criminal justice system.  However, the 
criminal justice system is currently still based on plea-bargains, 
and moreover, even if at some point, abolition is implemented, it 
is reasonable to assume that although the rate of plea-bargains 
will drop, they will not disappear altogether.  And regardless, 
this will certainly be a long process.  Thus, in the coming 
decades, I estimate that the system will continue to be based on 
plea-bargains to some extent. 
As more than ninety percent of criminal proceedings end in 
plea-bargains today, I will demonstrate how the STAMP safety 
model can be applied in criminal procedure specifically with 
regard to the plea-bargain mechanism, which is perhaps the 
central area of prevailing U.S. criminal law. 
 
B. System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
 
Professor Nancy Leveson has developed a sophisticated 
safety model, best known by its acronym “STAMP”— System-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes.  The model is based 
on a new systems theory, according to which traditional safety 
methods are not adequate for complex systems.  Leveson 
proposes shifting the emphasis from the reliability of a 
system’s components to system control.101  To begin with, every 
system must be examined closely to determine what safety 
constraints are imperative for it to operate without mishap.  
For example, with regard to metro subway systems, one of the 
necessary constraints is that “[d]oors must be capable of 
opening only after train is stopped and properly aligned with 
platform unless emergency exists.”102  Likewise, similar 
constraints can—and should—be devised for the criminal 
justice system, so as to prevent false convictions. 
 
 
101.  NANCY G. LEVESON, ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS 
THINKING APPLIED TO SAFETY 7–14 (2011); see also NANCY LEVESON, NICOLAS 
DULAC, KAREN MARAIS & JOHN CARROLL, MOVING BEYOND NORMAL ACCIDENTS 
AND HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SAFETY IN 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 5–6 (2009) (quoting Todd R. La Porte & Paula Consolini, 
Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High-
Reliability Organizations, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 19 (1991)).  
102.  LEVESON, supra note 101, at 192 
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The next stage in Leveson’s model is the setting of 
hierarchical control structures that will ensure the 
enforcement of the safety constraints required for the system.  
Safety, Leveson explains, is a feature throughout the system, 
in its entirety, and not limited to any one component in the 
system.  She eloquently summarizes her model in her recent 
book ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: 
 
STAMP focuses particular attention on the role 
of constraints in safety management. Accidents 
are seen as resulting from inadequate control or 
enforcement of constraints on safety-related 
behavior at each level of the system development 
and system operations control structures. 
Accidents can be understood in terms of why the 
controls that were in place did not prevent or 
detect maladaptive changes. 
 
Accident causal analysis based on STAMP starts 
with identifying the safety constraints that were 
violated and then determines why the controls 
designed to enforce the safety constraints were 
inadequate or, if they were potentially adequate, 
why the system was unable to exert appropriate 
control over their enforcement. 
 
In this conception of safety, there is no ‘root 
cause.’ Instead, the accident ‘cause’ consists of an 
inadequate safety control structure that under 
some circumstances leads to the violation of a 
behavioral safety constraint. Preventing future 
accidents requires reengineering or designing the 
safety control structure to be more effective.103 
 
 
103.  LEVESON, supra note 101, at 100; see also Nancy Leveson, A New 
Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 42 SAFETY SCI. 237 (2004); 
Nancy G. Leveson, A New Approach to Hazard Analysis for Complex Systems 
(formulating the STAMP “recipe” for safety more succinctly as “identifying 
the constraints required to maintain safety and then designing the system 
and operating conditions to ensure that the constraints are enforced.”). 
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 As Leveson shows in ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD, 
STAMP has been tested with success—by her and, 
subsequently, by others—on different types of actual operating 
systems.  Her model has proven to be both efficient and 
economical for the investigation of accidents as well as safety 
engineering, which aims to prevent accidents in advance.  As 
she explains, 
 
The more one knows about an accident process, 
the more difficult it is to find one person or part 
of the system responsible, but the easier it is to 
find effective ways to prevent similar occurrences 
in the future. 
 
STAMP is useful not only in analyzing accidents 
that have occurred but in developing new and 
potentially more effective system engineering 
methodologies to prevent accidents. Hazard 
analysis can be thought of as investigating an 
accident before it occurs. Traditional hazard 
analysis techniques, such as fault tree analysis 
and various types of failure analysis techniques, 
do not work well for very complex systems, for 
software errors, human errors, and system 
design errors. Nor do they usually include 
organizational and management flaws.104 
 
 This final point is of particular relevance to our context, as 
the majority of failures in the criminal justice system are not 
technological errors but rather stem from human error and 
organizational and management flaws.  Leveson clarifies that 
although system engineering was developed originally for 
technical systems, the STAMP approach is just as important 
and applicable to social systems, “[a]ll systems are engineered 
in the sense that they are designed to achieve specific goals, 
namely to satisfy requirements and constraints. So ensuring 
hospital safety or pharmaceutical safety . . . fall[s] within the 
 
104.  LEVESON, supra note 101, at 101. 
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broad definition of engineering.”105  Accordingly, the article 
proposes applying and implementing the STAMP model in the 
criminal justice system. 
 
C. Plea-bargain X STAMP = Safety 
 
 Under Leveson’s advanced STAMP (System-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes) safety model, for each of the 
hazards existing in the plea-bargains system, the safety 
constraints necessary in the criminal justice system for 
preventing these hazards must be defined; for each of these 
constraints, controls (and barriers) must also be defined, whose 
purpose is to enforce the safety constraints.  This will require a 
process of thorough safety thinking, which can be done by 
teams of experts, in the framework of a Safety in the Criminal 
Justice System Institute (SCJSI) that I suggest to establish.106  
As an example, and for the purpose of the current article, I will 
now focus, of course, on plea-bargains.  
 If we focus on a defendant’s confession given in the 
framework of a plea-bargain, using the above detailed 
theoretical analysis of plea-bargains, it is possible to think of 
some hazards and the safety constraints necessary to prevent 
each hazard, as well as the controls (and barriers) needed to 
enforce these safety constraints, as analyzed in a Table below.  
It is important to clarify that I do not claim my Table to 
exhaust all the safety constraints for plea-bargains that are 
 
105.  Id. at 176; see also id. at 198–209 (“Safety Control Structures in 
Social Systems”). 
106.  Introducing modern safety into systems lacking a culture of safety 
requires the establishment of a special institute to carry out this function, 
and the securing of resources necessary for the new institute to operate in a 
meaningful way.  Thus, for example, in the field of aviation, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) was established; in the field of transportation, 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was founded; in the area of 
food and drugs, there is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) serves the 
occupational field; and various such bodies were established in the medical 
field, such as the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS)  and the Center 
for Patient Safety Research and Practice.  In all of these fields, the 
recognition of safety issues and the need to improve performance led to 
national focus on safety leadership, the development of a knowledge base, 
and the distribution of information, an agenda to which substantial resources 
were devoted. 
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necessary to make the system safe from the hazard of false 
convictions, and it certainly does not represent all the controls 
(and barriers) needed for enforcing these safety constraints.  
This will all be determined following comprehensive 
groundwork by the Safety in the Criminal Justice System 
Institute (SCJSI).  My main goal is to demonstrate what 
general direction systematic safety thinking should take in 
order to develop safety in the criminal justice system and 
reduce the risk of wrongfully convicting innocent defendants 
based on plea-bargains. The following is my Table of Analyzing 
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Hazards Safety Constraints & Controls 
1. A plea-bargain 
leads to a false 
confession. 
Safety Constraints: 
(a) A confession (in the framework of 
a plea-bargain) must be voluntary.  
(b) A confession (in the framework of a 
plea-bargain) must be credible. 
(c) A temptation to confess must not be 
created by offering a considerably lighter 
sentence to a defendant if he confesses 
(in the framework of a plea-bargain) than 
the expected sentence if convicted at 
trial. 
(d) The defendant must not be pressured 
to confess (in the framework of a plea-
bargain). 
Controls (and Barriers): 
(e) A plea-bargain must not be made with 
a defendant if there is no significant 
evidence against him. 
(f) A plea-bargain must not be made with 
someone prior to deciding to indict him. 
(g) A charge must not be included in the 
indictment as solely a negotiations tool. 
(h) A plea-bargain must not be made 
with a defendant who has no legal 
representation. 
(i) All of the evidence gathered by the 
prosecution must be disclosed to the  
defendant and his attorney, so that they 
can arrive at an informed decision. 
(j) The various stages of the plea-bargain 
negotiations and agreement must be 
documented. 
(k) Prosecutors must be taught about the 
hazards of violating Guidelines (a)–(j). 
(l) A supervisory mechanism must be 
instituted to ensure that prosecutors act in 
accordance with Guidelines (a)–(j). 
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2. Hazard: A 
defendant is 
convicted based 
on a false 
confession 
attained through a 
plea-bargain. 
Safety Constraints: 
(a) Judges must determine whether a 
confession was made voluntarily. They 
must hear a detailed explanation from 
defendants as to why they confessed. 
(b) Judges must not accept a confession 
if there are significant indications that it 
is false. Judges must instruct defendants 
to describe in detail the reasons for 
committing the crime they have 
confessed to. 
(c) A conviction must not be based on a 
confession if it is the sole piece of 
evidence (because the confession could 
be false). 
(d) A conviction based on a confession 
must have strong corroboration (not only 
with respect to corpus delicti but also 
with regard to the identification of the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime). 
 Controls (and Barriers): 
(e) Judges must not accept a confession 
obtained through a significant violation 
by the prosecution of any of the above 
guidelines directed at the prosecution 
(1(a)–(j)). 
(f) Judges must receive from the 
prosecution a detailed written description 
of the negotiations process preceding the 
plea-bargain. 
(g) Judges must receive for review all of 
the prosecution's evidence materials so 
as to ensure that the additional pieces of 
evidence—aside from the confession—
significantly implicate the defendant as 
the perpetrator of the crime. 
(h) Judges must be instructed in training 
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workshops on the hazards of violating 
Guidelines (a)–(g). 
(i) In an appeal of a conviction, there 
must be close scrutiny of whether all the 
guidelines relating to the above two 
hazards were followed. 
(j) Following conviction, a plea-bargain 
must not be seen as a barrier to filing an 
appeal or moving for a retrial, and any 
new piece of evidence that is likely to 
indicate that the conviction was false 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
There is a significant risk - in safety terms: a hazard - that 
the wide gap between the defendant’s anticipated punishment 
if convicted at trial and the relatively lighter punishment if he 
confesses in the plea-bargain will lead not only the guilty but 
also the innocent to confessing.  American plea bargaining 
creates huge incentives for the innocent people to plead guilty; 
it is generally acknowledged that innocent defendants are 
offered great enticements to falsely confess. 
At present, following the findings of studies throughout the 
world, it is already clear that there is a significant phenomenon 
of wrongful convictions based on plea-bargains.  More than 90% 
of the convictions are decided without proof by significant 
evidence, but on the basis of plea-bargains.  Plea-bargains are 
one of the central mechanisms facilitating false convictions. 
There have always been, and always will be, accidents.  In 
some aspects of our life, this appears to be an inevitable reality.  
However, a high rate of accidents is not an unavoidable fact of 
life, but rather the product of human negligence; or even 
indifference—when we are aware of the danger but do not act 
purposefully to reduce it. 
Since safety theory and safety measures are not developed 
in the criminal justice system, we have to learn it from other 
areas, such as aviation, transportation and engineering.  For 
this purpose, the article uses the advanced STAMP safety 
model to develop an innovative model of safety from false 
convictions based on plea-bargains, in which after the 
hazards are identified, safety constraints, controls and barriers 
are suggested. 
It is my hope that this article succeeds to convince of the 
need to “THINK SAFETY” and to establish safety 
requirements with the power to generate a truly positive 
change and to significantly reduce the terrible phenomenon of 
false convictions based on plea-bargains. 
In tandem with making plea-bargains safer, the article 
also proposes a new rule, recognizing defendant’s right to a fair 
plea-bargain offer.  Plea-bargains need not be dependent on the 
goodwill of a particular prosecutor toward a particular 
defendant or her defense counsel. 
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